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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requirements, thus
expediting the grant approval process. When HUD approved the
grant, the funds were only to be used for preliminary purposes.
The DWS took $30,000 in grant funds in 1995 to pay for the
contractors working on the state EIS. This was the only time the DWS
drew upon the grant funds. In 1998, the DWS placed the Kohala
project on hold, but it assured HUD the project would resume.
Finally, in 1999, the DWS reallocated the funds to another project in
South Hilo.
Since NEPA did not have a separate judicial review provision and
the suit involved legal issues, the appellate court relied on the
reasonableness standard of review. The court noted that controlling
weight is given to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent.
NEPA only required an EIS if "major Federal actions significantly
affect the quality of the human environment." Because there is no
clear standard for determining what constitutes "major Federal
action," the analysis relies on the degree and nature of the
involvement. Here, the court weighed the amount of funds actually
spent on the project, the total amount of federal funding, and the total
estimated cost of the project and concluded that HUD and USGS's
involvement did not constitute "major Federal action." The court also
found that there could not be any "major Federal action" because of
the lack of decision-making power, authority and control HUD and
USGS possessed over the project. Furthermore, the DWS always
maintained final decision-making power over the project.
Ka Makani also argued that HUD's own provisions required an
EIS. The court found that HUD did not need to conduct an EIS if the
grant is a special purpose grant, as it was in this case. Furthermore,
the court held it illogical to conduct an EIS over the entire Kohala
project.
Staci A. McComb
Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that notice of alleged Clean Water
Act violations regarding a particular source is sufficient for all similar
claims derived from that same source in a citizen suit, and past cited
violations, along with evidence of present violations, is sufficient to
establish an ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act).
The Community Association for Restoration of the Environment
("CARE") brought a citizen suit against Henry Bosma and his two dairy
operations ("Bosma") in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington, alleging that Bosma violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") by discharging pollutants and manure into
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navigable waters without a permit. The court ruled in favor of CARE
finding that it provided Bosma with adequate notice of CARE's intent
to sue, and that CARE had established that Bosma's operation met the
definition of an ongoing violation as required under the CWA. Bosma
appealed both district court rulings to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and held that the
court did not commit "clear error" in finding that CARE provided
sufficient notice and proved an ongoing violation existed.
Bosma owned and operated two dairies. Each dairy contained
approximately 3,000 head of cattle, and met the definition of a
concentrated animal feeding operation ("CAFO") under the CWA.
The Act describes a CAFO as a point source, and CAFO operators are
required to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. The Washington Department of Ecology ("DOE")
regulates CAFOs. For many years, Bosma had a record of discharge
problems, and refused three requests by DOE to obtain the required
NPDES permit. In January 1977, Bosma obtained a general NPDES
dairy permit from DOE for one of the dairies, and later modified the
permit to include both dairies in 1998.
A person seeking to bring suit under the citizen suit provision of
the CWA must give sixty days notice of his intent to sue to the alleged
violator, the administrator, and the state so that the violator has a
chance to comply and avoid litigation. In October 1997, CARE sent
notice of its intent to sue Bosma for twelve allegedly illegal discharges.
Within sixty days, CARE filed a complaint in the district court alleging
the original violations listed in the mailed notice, and thirty-two
additional violations. Bosma argued that the original notice alleging
twelve violations was insufficient notice of CARE's thirty-two additional
violations, however, the appellate court found that CARE's notice was
adequate and provided Bosma with sufficient information so that
Bosma had knowledge of the point source where the alleged violations
occurred.
The CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants, and defines
discharge of pollutant as any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance from any point source. CARE alleged that Bosma, as a
point source, violated the CWA over thirty times by allowing the
manure from his two dairies to drain illegally into a drainage system
that eventually drained into navigable waters. Moreover, CARE
asserted that Bosma's manure fields were part of the point source
under the CWA and that the discharge of manure was included under
the CWA. The appellate court found that CARE's notice sufficient for
all alleged violations because the violations were all derived from the
same point source, and the multiple violations constituted several
instances of a single violation.
The CWA requires that notice provides sufficient information so
that the alleged violator can identify the alleged actions and the dates
of violation, the persons responsible, and the name and contact
information of the person giving notice. Focusing on the statute, the
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court of appeals looked to the words "sufficient information" and
determined that Bosma received adequate notice. It determined that
the purpose of notice is to prevent litigation and allow the violator to
correct the problem. Then the court interpreted point source to
include manure fields, reasoning that the purpose of the CWA is to
regulate all discharges, including those coming from land near a
drainage ditch. This conclusion, paired with ample evidence that
Bosma was aware the drainage ditch drained into navigable waters,
provided Bosma with notice of all closely related claims in regards to
the drainage ditch. Thus, notice to a person or company in violation
may serve as notice for all similar claims derived from the same source.
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's finding that
CARE proved the existence of an ongoing violation. It considered
multiple violations over time as an ongoing violation unless Bosma
could prove that there was no likelihood of repeating the violation.
Repetition may be inferred by the trier of fact, or implied when
additional violations occur after the plaintiff filed suit. The court of
appeals rejected Bosma's argument that CARE had not presented
sufficient evidence to show he actually committed the alleged
violations, and that therefore, future violations could not be inferred.
It found CARE had proven the existence of past violations by
providing evidence of date-specific violations. The court also inferred
an ongoing violation in light of the particular facts of the case. The
DOE had cited Bosma for numerous violations in the past and Bosma
refused to obtain a permit for many years. Additionally, CARE
provided testimony, photos, and video footage showing that Bosma
placed deposits of manure in proximity to the water after CARE filed
suit. The court of appeals concluded that evidence of past violations,
in conjunction with evidence of existing violations, was a basis for a
reasonable person to infer that there may be continuing violations.
Because Bosma failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary,
the court affirmed the district court's decision.
Holly Shook
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that: (1) individual farmers and state agencies showed
a genuine issue of material fact as to risk of injury-in-fact to confer
Article III standing; and (2) claim and issue preclusion did not bar
action against the Bureau of Reclamation).
Two farmers in the Central Delta Area of the San Joaquin River
("San Joaquin") and two California State Agencies ("State Agencies")
sued the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") and pursued a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California to prevent flooding of fisheries unless the
BOR reserved sufficient water to meet salinity standards downstream.

